



THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)

News from the Front!

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**U.S. Army Theater Missile Defense Element (ATMDE)
Revolutionizing the Army's Go-to-War Capability**

**by MAJ James Molnar, U. S. Air Force Air Ground Operations School, Hurlburt
Field, FL**

The threat posed to American forces by aerial delivered means has changed dramatically since the mid 1980s. During the height of the cold war, the threat to U.S. forces by manned, fixed-wing aircraft was high, while attack by cruise missiles and UAV was essentially inconsequential. Today we are seeing this trend reverse itself, and we can expect the threat from cruise missiles, UAVs, and theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) to continue to grow well into the 21st century. As the manned aircraft threat diminishes, we see the risk and availability of theater missiles increasing. Potential threat countries have the ability to produce and/or acquire significant tactical missile technology and the capability to threaten U.S. forces and assets, as well as those of our allies and friends.



When we consider that, with an investment of \$50 million, any hostile nation or terrorist organization could purchase hundreds of off-the-shelf cruise missiles, or 100 reconnaissance UAVs, or 15 TBMs with Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs), or 10 utility helicopters, or four attack helicopters, or 1 - 2 superior fixed-wing fighters, it is not hard to see where the best bang for the buck can be obtained.

As the threat from manned aircraft decreases, the risk and availability of theater missiles by anyone possessing the capital to gain them are increasing. Theater missiles provide hostile forces an affordable means to counter U.S. force projection, especially with weapons of mass destruction.

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


Figure 1



Historical Perspective

Operation DESERT STORM and subsequent operations around the world have clearly demonstrated the geopolitical and tactical leverage gained by use of both ballistic and cruise missiles. Threat of SCUD attacks far outweighed the threat of attack by manned fighter and attack aircraft during the Gulf War. This drove our defensive strategy to focus on the SCUD hunt much more than a strategy to defeat manned fighter and attack aircraft.

The Army Chief of Staff recognized that nothing currently exists to integrate the family of weapons and capabilities to counter the theater missile threat. He tasked the U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command to create an organization dedicated to TMD planning and execution. This led to the creation of the Army Theater Missile Defense Element (ATMDE). ATMDE was conceived and built to fill the need for a battle management facility to synchronize and energize Army TMD operations. The resulting TOC was built in less than six months. It uses existing or off-the-shelf capabilities, as it serves as an information engine for the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC). To provide the ATMDE with the operating capability to integrate the TMD battle, the Army Space Command (Forward) and the Program Manager (PM) Air Defense Command and Control Systems (ADCCS) developed a prototype Force Projection TOC. The resulting TOC is a fusion and synchronization operations center designed to provide the JFLCC with the ability to horizontally integrate air, sea, and ground battle information for theater missile defense.

The TMD Force Projection TOC is the Army's interface into the joint and missile defense architecture, interoperating with elements of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and allies. This interoperability is assured using current, commonly used assets. It is the only existing operations center having the capability or requirement to integrate the three operational pillars of TMD in a tactical environment by providing foundation Battle Management and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (BM/C4I) capabilities for the JFLCC.

The ATMDE Force Projection TOC

The ATMDE Force Projection TOC is an integral system capable of insertion by one C-141 or two C-130s in the early entry phase of battle, and can operate throughout the entire spectrum of conflict from early entry through nation building. It is revolutionary and stands as a prototype for future Army command and control facilities.

Composed of five HMMWVs, this mobile system, operated by a platoon of soldiers, provides a timely assessment of the threat, rapid dissemination of tactical warning, targeting data, and engagement/battle damage status assessments to the JFLCC.

ATMDE personnel are the experts in the IPB/TEL hunt. They can furnish capabilities and command and control for the counter TEL fight by providing the echelon above corps (EAC) air defense picture as well as passive defense and early warning. The ATMDE TOC provides a fused, joint picture of the battlefield by processing information from a myriad of sources as depicted in Figure 2. ATMDE is a self-contained initial early entry force with engagement operations capabilities. It provides a nucleus for two G2/G3 operations crews capable of 24-hour operations, along with the communications architecture for liaison officer functions for Navy, Air Force, and Marine LOs.




Figure 2
ATMDE Inputs



The rapidly deployable TOC receives and displays a focused and synchronized picture of the joint battlefield. It displays the air picture viewed by the Army's ground-based air defense system. It also displays the air picture as processed by the Air Force's airborne surveillance assets and traditional ground-based Theater Air Control System (TACS) systems through an interface to the Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS) and the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), as well as Navy and Marine Corps surface, airborne, surveillance, and engagement operations. Attack operations conducted by air, sea, and land forces are displayed as well as the friendly/enemy ground situation. ATMDE can also interface to the ASAS Warrior system.

All of the fuzzed information will help the JFLCC in decisionmaking, and while integrating from a number of different sources, all available information is displayed to the commander on a central workstation.

Theater Missile Defense Command Relationships

Current joint doctrine synchronizes all component service TMD capabilities. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) establishes priority of joint TMD effort, the methodology for TMD planning, and establishes the component areas of operation. Active defense forces are under the operational control (OPCON) of their component commander. The component commanders in turn plan and execute joint TMD as directed by the JFC. The component commanders are the supported commanders within their areas of responsibility (AORs), providing warning to all assigned forces in sector, exercising operational control of assigned active defense forces, and centrally planning and decentrally executing active defense operations.

Joint Theater Missile Defense

Joint TMD includes three pillars of passive defense, active defense, and attack operations built upon a solid BM/C4I foundation as depicted in Figure 3.



Figure 3
The Pillars of TMD

Passive defense activities include the planning of input to the high priority target list (HPTL), assessment of the passive defense procedures and plan, and recommendations for chemical and medical forces allocation. Passive defense executes timely refined early warning, involves the use of organic NBC defense measures, and includes camouflage, cover and concealment techniques, as well as situational awareness of the joint ground, air, and naval picture. It also includes the coordination of NBC responses to TMD strikes.



Active defense measures involve the preparation of input to the TMD aerial IPB process and coordination and recommendation of EAC force allocation. The Army has been designated the DOD lead in passive defense operations by virtue of its proven capability for timely warning, organic NBC defense measures, and camouflage, cover, concealment, and deception expertise. Active defense activities also monitor the joint counter air battle and EAC air defense status and engagements, together with air defense engagement operations. The Army has the only proven all weather, day/night combat capability to wage active defense operations to date, over wide area coverages.

TMD attack operations include the preparation of input to the TMD IPB process. Attack operations refine IPB, input targets into the deep fires plan, plan MLRS missions, monitor MLRS unit status and capabilities, and execute TMD fire missions to MLRS. ATMDE coupled with other Army attack capabilities (Army Tactical Advanced Conventional Munitions System (ATACMS) and Apache attack helicopters), now gives the Army the only all-weather, day/night TMD attack operations capability. This capability compliments both ground and air systems with an integrated sensor to shooter architecture. This capability can be exercised over extended ranges and is rapidly deployable.

The foundation to TMD, BM/C4I, assists in preparation of inputs into the TMD Annex to the OPOD and recommendation of TMD priorities and force allocation. BM/C4I fuses the national, theater, and tactical intelligence systems and friendly force data, and provides the communications architecture for the joint force (USAF, USN, JFMDC, and other friendly forces). The advent of ATMDE gives the Army a new high capacity, point to point and wide-area BM/C4I capability. It is rapidly deployable with several automated interfaces to other C2 systems, thus affording the JFLCC joint interoperability and redundancy by echelon.

FORCE XXI Implications

ATMDE should play a dominant role in Force XXI operations development. **TRADOC Pam 525-1, *Force XXI Operations***, is a living document that now serves as the milestone in the Army's journey into the 21st century. Because ATMDE is so new, no current doctrine exists for its use. Its delivery will revolutionize the way the Army plans, integrates, and conducts TMD. Army TMD strategy (not doctrine) addresses the three pillars of TMD, active defense, passive defense, attack operations built on the BM/C4I foundation discussed above.

ATMDE's active defense node provides mission planning, defense assessment, early entry C2, aerial and tactical IPB, mission target detection, target nomination, collection management, and fire unit status.

The passive defense nodes provide terrain analysis, refined early warning, NBC reconnaissance cueing, and vulnerability analysis.

Another support node provides integrated TMD situation awareness by projecting a common picture (air/ground - blue/red) on the battle manager's large screen display.

U.S. Army Space Command has perfected the passive defense, active defense, and attack operations pillars of TMD. This ATMDE brings the foundation BM/C4I to maturity. When perfected and delivered to the Army, ATMDE will require TOE changes and possible establishment of a new MOS or ASI to indicate personnel trained in the use of this TMD system. Changes will also be required in future national and specific Army satellite structure architecture.



BG Morris J. Boyd, Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Headquarters, TRADOC, in a recent article published in *Army*, May 1995, titled, "A Milestone in the Army's Journey into the Next Century," stated,

"By leveraging current advances in information technology, Force XXI will be characterized by common, relevant, situational awareness throughout all echelons of command. This shared awareness enables the force to achieve coherence in the action throughout the battlespace, enhancing the commander's ability to maneuver, deliver fires and protect the force.

This will also enhance the lethality and survivability of the force while improving the commander's capability to control the tempo of combat operations and other scenarios. The coexistence of horizontal and vertical command/information processes will allow the force to pass information in a more internetted manner so that leaders and soldiers at all echelons will gain a better understanding of the commander's intent and concept of the operation.

In turn, the commander will have a better awareness of the disposition and status of his forces and those of his adversary. Future operational scenarios we see emerging even today require the commander to protect friendly systems and attack enemy systems; use, manage, and understand military information systems; and understand the global information environment to control or dominate the operational information environment. This notion of information operations must permeate all functions throughout the pattern of operations.

The implication of moving toward General Sullivan's Force XXI objective is important to consider. Doctrine, for example, will remain relevant and flexible and continue to keep pace with advances in technology and the changing geostrategic environment. In training, combinations of virtual, live, and constructive simulations for soldier, unit, and joint/combined arms training across the full range of conflict will enable the Army to practice, rehearse and train to a higher standard, and to do it more often. The Army will continue to leverage the successes of its combined training centers, the battle command and training program, and many aspects of the officer and NCO training systems. Future Army organizations will likely be smaller, but with new expanded and diverse missions, and increased capabilities because of technological advances required to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing and unpredictable world."

ATMDE is prepared and ready to support these requirements and meet the challenges outlined by BG Boyd today. ATMDE goes on the "green ramp" and becomes a deployable system in June 1995. An evolution is envisioned where the TOC will continue to grow, change, and evolve much like the vision described in FM 525-5, Force XXI Operations. The TOC will continue to incorporate the latest technologies, with the realization that better products and systems will be available tomorrow. USARSPACE realized the importance of technology and dedicated manpower to this effort. The ATMDE TOC will revolutionize the way the Army conducts operations as we move toward full implementation of Force XXI operations methodologies, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.

Army leadership recognizes the need to develop a holistic approach to TMD. ATMDE is designed to meet that challenge. Yesterday's poorly integrated stovepipe approaches have given way to a new seamless, synergistic, and integrated approach. Our passive defense architecture is better defined, resulting in better force protection. Today the ATMDE provides the JFLCC joint and inter-operable TMD and BM/C4I capabilities unlike any capability before; there is no sanctuary for TELs any longer.



COMBAT DECISIONMAKING IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

by Senior Observer Controllers, Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC)

**"Tis not hard, I think,
For men so old as we to keep the peace."
- William Shakespeare (1)**

The presence and role of the U.N., other U.S. government and international agencies, allied forces and nongovernmental organizations in Operations Other than War (OOTW) add yet more complexity to the challenge of command and control. The varied interests of these entities are often incongruent with one another. The mission focus may shift in this highly charged political environment. A recent case in point occurred in Somalia when U.S. forces conducted concurrent humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under U.N. auspices.

Therefore, command of U.S. military forces in OOTW can be an intricate process. Decisionmaking particularly requires a pragmatic, flexible methodology due to the unique conditions that characterize OOTW. The multifaceted civil-military environment noted above may give rise to open-ended mission statements or vague mission end state. In addition, the potential for periods of intense violence may exist requiring a precipitous escalation of force followed by an equally rapid return to restraint. Finally, the nonlinear spatial nature of OOTW often requires the commander to rely on decentralized execution of his decisions and orders.

Applying the Combat Decisionmaking Model to OOTW: The concept, planning, preparation, execution and assessment (CPEA) methodology discussed in FM 101-5, Chapter 4, is one of the three doctrinal methods of decisionmaking in combat operations. However, CPEA's proactive focus on continuous planning for future events based on the outcome of current operations also makes it an ideal tool for decisionmaking in OOTW where several events may occur simultaneously or in quick succession. It is particularly useful for commanders at the brigade and battalion levels where time constraints and staff limitations inhibit deliberate decisionmaking. The process for OOTW discussed here is much the same as the CPEA model designed for combat decisionmaking. However, it incorporates political as well as military environmental conditions that the commander must consider as he makes his running estimates. Accordingly, the methodology depicted in Figure 1 incorporates terminology and processes germane to both combat and noncombat operations. For example, in peacekeeping, what might otherwise be called enemy forces are frequently termed "former belligerents," intelligence collection becomes information gathering, and so on.

CPEA MODEL FOR OOTW




Figure 1



At the brigade level, the commander's initial concept focuses on at least one suitable method for employing allocated resources to accomplish missions within the intent and plans of the commander two levels higher. The commander considers not only essential specified and implied military tasks in formulating a concept for an operation, but critical political tasks as well. In practice, political interests typically outweigh military necessity in the conduct of OOTW and place additional constraints on military forces. Peacekeeping operations, for example, are conducted in accordance with Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter which requires the consent of the parties in conflict. This mutual consent compels U.N. Forces to execute their mandate with absolute impartiality. Peacekeepers have no enforcement rights in the strictest sense and may legally employ force only as a last resort in self-defense (2). Constraints, such as restrictive rules of engagement, sometimes pose a dilemma for the commander because of the concurrent necessity for force protection. Beyond the consequences to troop welfare and morale, friendly casualties suffered during noncombat operations can be politically disastrous. One brigade commander whose unit recently returned from performing humanitarian assistance operations in Rwanda noted that balancing the OOTW principles of security and restraint was one of his most difficult challenges (3).

The commander's broad visualization of how he will incorporate OOTW imperatives, such as restraint, legitimacy and force protection, into mission accomplishment is embodied in his intent. Purpose, method and end state are the key ingredients for communicating how an operation will proceed. Perhaps the most difficult, yet essential mental process in formulating and articulating intent is the visualization of critical events leading from current condition to end state. The commander's understanding of his current state, coupled with his visualization of critical events which lie on the path to the desired future state, should drive the plans and orders on which his concepts for the operation (Figure 2) are further refined. Sharing that visual road map toward the future state, is the primary means for the commander to communicate to his staff where forces will be concentrated and how their activities are synchronized at decisive points to accomplish pivotal tasks.

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT




Figure 2

As in combat operations, tasks in OOTW may be event driven, time suspended and sequential. Many tasks in peacekeeping, such as the clearing of a zone of separation, demand that the commander's staff build flexibility into suspenses imposed on subordinate units regarding task completion. Maintaining legitimacy with the various parties in a U.N. operation requires continual reassessment of timelines within a plan. Perseverance is a key ingredient to success for peacekeeping forces. The maxim "a good peacekeeping day does not necessarily equal a good military day" rings true in this regard.



Information Requirements for Decisions in OOTW: An accurate assessment of the current situation is also a requisite for formulating clear intent. The commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) tell subordinate commanders and staff which key pieces of information are missing from his visualization of the operation. Whether these missing pieces are related to how the commander sees his own forces or how he sees other actors, CCIR will link key decisions with major events. Therefore, information acquisition, assimilation and evaluation are as essential to planning for critical events in OOTW as the intelligence preparation of the battlefield is to offensive combat operations.

There are often differences in the information products developed for OOTW vis-a-vis battlefield operations. Terrain and weather factors, for example, will have obvious effects on planning ground emergency aid convoys incidental to a humanitarian assistance operation. Besides the standard terrain overlay, the OOTW information process will also consider key facilities, population status, lines of communication and sustaining logistics. Similarly, the commander must also evaluate threats posed by potentially hostile parties based on their capabilities and likely courses of action. Political considerations, particularly at the local level, are equally as germane to anticipating hostile intent as they are in determining the feasibility of a friendly course of action. Face-to-face contact with key local faction leaders may provide the commander his greatest insight as to psychological factors, such as personality, which affect their behavior.

Intuitive and Rational Reasoning in OOTW: Similarly, intuitive skills may also give commanders an important advantage in sensing opportunities and risks in seemingly ambiguous political situations. Intuition also lets the commander focus rapidly on feasible solutions to a problem without rational thought when time for systematic analysis is unavailable. It builds largely from experiential learning of similar situations encountered over a commander's career.⁽⁴⁾ However, as in combat operations, intuitive cognition in OOTW may complement rational decisionmaking when time and certainty permit a more scientific approach. It follows then that intuition may also help staff officers as they role-play the various parties and identify their likely reactions to friendly courses of action during wargaming.

Given the importance of the psychological dimension in OOTW, brigade and battalion task force-level threat evaluation will likely require a high degree of reliance on local human sources of information. Moreover, information access and control provide the commander with the political leverage that is often necessary to gain influence over other players. Therefore, the acquisition, analysis and distribution of information in OOTW demand that military organizations adopt an interagency approach. Nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, such as the International Red Cross, Save the Children, the World Council of Churches, and others, may be very helpful in providing data needed by military commanders and other players. In any case, information-gathering in OOTW must be tempered to ensure perceptions of trust and impartiality are maintained in spite of the fact information will inevitably be used to gain progress toward attaining mission objectives.

During the development and refinement of his concept, the commander's staff must synchronize the multitude of activities occurring in the operational area. To achieve mass in OOTW, the staff just focuses the effects of friendly forces and actions at the decisive time and place. As in high tempo battle, a synchronization matrix is a useful tool for execution of critical events and other supporting tasks in OOTW (Figure 3).



SAMPLE SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX - U.N. HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOY

| EVENT/ SYSTEM | ILLEGAL CHECKPOINT OR ROADBLOCK | CIVILIAN RIOT OR DEMONSTRATION | ARTILLERY OR MORTAR ATTACK | MINE OBSTACLE |
|---|--|---|---|--|
| INTELLIGENCE | -NAI 3,7,11,14A -ID Bypass -CI Videotape Incident | -MP Patrols on RTEs Blue,Gold -HUMINT Debrief | -NAI9,11,25,27 -Crater Analysis | -NAI 22,26,27 -Debrief EOD - Dissem.Mine Threat Info. |
| MANEUVER | -QRF Show of Force | -Evac. UN Personnel -Protect Key Facil. -CA/MP DC Collection | -PSYOP Leaflets -AVN Show of Force | -CA/MP Control DC/Refugees -PSYOP Loudspk. |
| FIRE SUPPORT | -TAI 5,12,14,33 Illum/Smoke | -QRF B/P Employ CS/OC (Spray) | -Q36 Radar EA FOX -No Fire TAI 2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,1 1,13,15-32 | |
| MOBILITY COUNTER MOBILITY SURVIVABILITY | -Clear Mines -Reduce Wire Obstacle | -Reinforce Cordon w/wire | -Road Repair -O/O Deploy Bridge | -Threat Educ. -Breach/Mark -Damage Control |
| COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT | -Refuel -O/O Aerial Resupply | -CASEVAC QRF. -CA/MP Area Damage -Resched. Convoys | Recovery to LOGBASE WINDY | -CASEVAC -CA Assess HN Medical Fac. |
| AIR DEFENSE | Avenger PLT Augment Surveillance | | | |
| BATTLE COMMAND | -OIC Negotiate -Auth. Bypass | -HN/UN CIVPOL -MP Divert UN Traffic -Req. JTF Auth. CS/OC -PAO/LNO Press Teams | -Determine Hostile Intent | -MP TCPs RTE Blue, Gold |

Figure 3

For the staff, detailed coordination of activities involves analysis and identification of how different activities best support one another temporarily and spatially. For subordinate commanders, the synchronization matrix facilitates the tracking of crucial tasks, especially since execution in OOTW tends to be highly decentralized and may involve multiple supporting units.

Decentralized execution also complicates the process of gaining feedback, both during and after operations (Figure 4).

OPERATIONS FEEDBACK

EXECUTE OPERATIONS




Figure 4



As implied in the discussion on information requirements, the foundation of high value feedback is the articulation of CCIR. Focused information requirements linked to accurate reporting by subordinate elements will provide the commander with the feedback he desires to maintain a running estimate of the situation. In certain OOTW activities, such as checkpoint operations, detailed and structured reporting orders are often necessary for deployed forces.

As in combat operations, the different parties engaged in OOTW will inevitably attempt to put a favorable slant on their version of critical events that occur. Coordination among U.S. military forces, multinational partners, civilian agencies and often with the former belligerent parties themselves is vital for the dissemination of key information. Unity of effort is achieved through the establishment of a well-defined liaison effort. Commanders must designate their LOs as the primary channel for communication with external agencies. "Hotlines" to the former belligerent parties often allow the commander to reconcile conflicting reports of incidents and, thus, receive feedback necessary for analysis of complex political - military situations.

Media reporting also assumes a major role in the operations feedback portion of the OOTW decisionmaking process. In peacekeeping operations, there are often fewer restrictions placed on television and radio coverage of military activities. Because of the real-time capability of the electronic media to portray images of events to worldwide audiences, an isolated incident at a remote checkpoint may quickly become the focal point of domestic U.S. public debate of an entire operation. This underscores the value of disciplined, well-informed soldiers who are at the cutting edge of any proactive information management effort during mission execution.

The commander's ability to assimilate information flowing from these often conflicting sources is vitally important. His personal observations gained during movement throughout the area of operations are equally essential for they contribute to the intuitive sensing of the general situation. Just as a feel for the ongoing fight in the heat of battle allows the commander to react more quickly than the enemy, so does "reading the political tea leaves." It allows him to anticipate his next move in OOTW. The political impact of activity occurring in the areas of operations is just as vital to the success of peacekeeping as are the military implications of that activity.

In the final segment of the CPEA model, the commander's situation assessment, coupled with directives from higher headquarters, determines whether new concepts for future operations are necessary (Figure 5).

FORMULATING FUTURE OPS




Figure 5

A shift toward a semi-permissive environment, for example, may dictate a reexamination of concepts for force protection during PKO. The commander may also begin weighing the feasibility of peace enforcement options to regain the initiative in a deteriorating situation. These types of political-military dynamics will drive mission reanalysis and continuation of the decisionmaking cycle.



Combat Decisionmaking - A Versatile Tool: Army forces will continue to conduct a variety of missions and roles as part of U.S. post-Cold War security strategy. Thus, the notion of a versatile force able to respond to contingencies across the entire spectrum of conflict is incorporated in current doctrine. However, the commander's primary tasks of leading soldiers and deciding how to accomplish the unit's mission remain essentially unchanged. While the conditions inherent in OOTW may differ from high tempo combat, the processes involved in command of such operations are still much the same. Decisionmaking particularly requires a systematic method for stabilizing fluid situations as well as a degree of intuition that can make military sense of complex political problems. The combat decisionmaking model is one important tool for simultaneous planning and execution of peacekeeping or other OOTW. Its main advantage is to provide a focus for soldiers by linking multiple and sometimes seemingly unrelated activities, political as well as military, in a unifying mission concept. Recent afteraction reviews confirm that the transition between noncombat and combat during OOTW tends to occur at unexpected times and places. One senior leader observed aptly, "All commanders must believe they are always only a heartbeat away from a gunfight" (5). Thus, brigade and battalion commanders will discover that the combat decisionmaking model has wide applicability across the entire range of potential conflict.

Footnotes

1. Quoted in Draft British Army Field Manual, *Wider Peacekeeping*, Fourth Draft Revised (United Kingdom, August 1994), p. 1-1.
2. *The Blue Helmets*, (New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, 1990), p. 6.
3. Colonel James P. McDonough, Briefing, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany, March 10, 1995.
4. Lussier, J.W., and Saxon, Terrill F., "*Critical Factors in the Art of Battle Command*" (Draft), Army Research Institute, July 1994, pp. 32-36.
5. Major General Carl F. Ernst, Joint Task Force Somalia Afteraction Review (undated slide briefing).



Displaced Person Operations

by MAJ Bill Huggins and CPT John Hort, Collection Division, CALL

CALL conducted on-site collection during operations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Panama. Due to the magnitude and scope of Operation SEA SIGNAL (Guantanamo, Cuba), Operation SAFE HAVEN (Empire Range, Panama), and Operation SAFE PASSAGE (movement of displaced persons from Panama to Cuba), the collection effort focused on observations unique to displaced person camp operations. For a detailed review of the collected observations, contact CPT John Hort, Combat Maneuver Analyst, Coml (913) 684-9590, DSN 552-9590 or E-mail:

Hort/@leav-emh.army.mil.

The following observations reflect only an initial analysis by CALL. Doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel and soldier support implications were identified for further study and staffing with service schools, and participating units.

Planning

Determining the task organization required a focused mission analysis from unit commanders and staffs.

The nontraditional nature of displaced person camp operations required additional augmentation, but also afforded brigade and battalion commanders the ability to incorporate doctrinal slice assets into the operation. Deploying units found that augmentations, such as comptroller, dental, finance, civil affairs, PSYOP, and liaison, were necessities to successfully sustain U.S. forces and displaced persons simultaneously. Site survey teams contributed immensely to the proper flavor and structure of a unit's task organization.



Internal Camp Security Operations

Internal security was the most critical mission during Operation SEA SIGNAL. The typical mission statement for a unit performing internal security directed that the unit was to provide humanitarian assistance and logistical support to the displaced person population. This statement did not fully capture the difficulties and challenges of the mission. Working as a member of the internal security force was probably the most stressful in the operation. The diverse demographics caused each camp to develop its own unique personality. Thus, the task organization and rules required for one camp were not, necessarily, appropriate for another. Key positions during Operation SEA SIGNAL included:

Camp Administration/ Logistics Section: This section consisted of an OIC, NCOIC, Operations Sergeant, supply technician, radio-telephone operator (RTO), and clerk. The mission of the section was to provide in-camp command and control. Operational tasks included population control, intelligence collection for input into the end of shift security report, and development of recommendations to the camp commander regarding administrative segregation and the employment of additional security forces.

Access Control Section: This section exercised control over all movements into and out of the camp by ensuring that all displaced persons were scanned on entry and exit, and that all others (nondisplaced persons) were listed on the camp access roster and were properly escorted.

Roving Patrols: Generally, patrols were made up of two-person teams that patrolled inside the camps. Patrols were responsible for enforcing camp rules and providing internal security for the camp population.

Camp Escorts: Escorts were used to move displaced persons from one area to another within the camp, between the camps, or from a camp to another location.

Internal Camp Security-Lessons:

➤ The internal security force must maintain a firm presence at all times until forced or ordered to withdraw. Camps must have a rehearsal plan for the initial containment of breaches in the external wire without withdrawing all of its internal security force.

➤ Security shifts must have riot control gear stationed for quick retrieval at all times.

➤ Camps must have an evacuation plan for all civilian personnel (NGOs, etc.) entering the camps. This plan must be activated at the onset of unrest. Civilians entering the camps to conduct negotiations must be briefed on security procedures and the evacuation plan before entering the camp.

➤ During minor disturbances, maintain routine and normalcy as much as possible in affected camps and in adjacent camps.

➤ Respond to each incident with the lowest level of force appropriate to the situation. However, ensure that additional forces are poised for an immediate response.

➤ The internal security force should strive to develop an atmosphere within the camp that is based on mutual respect and trust. It is better for the displaced persons to exercise self-rule and provide the leadership to administer the camp's day-to-day activities.

➤ A professional, ready posture is a major deterrent to disturbances.



Logistics

In addition to the primary mission of providing security for both displaced persons and soldiers, the internal security force also had the enormous task of feeding 2,000-2,500 displaced persons three meals a day, providing religious, recreational, and educational programs, and ensuring that all displaced persons attended appropriate appointments on time to facilitate their parole processing. The difficult task of providing displaced persons basic day-to-day supplies is further complicated by the fact that many of the supplies needed for male, female, child, infant and elderly populations are not available in the military supply system. For example, diapers, baby food, formula, feminine hygiene products, clothing, and shoes are not available in the system. Many of these supplies are provided by the Red Cross or other PVOs.

Training

Training requirements for the internal security force differ somewhat from those of the external security force. Institutional training should consider instruction on unique OOTW tasks to include: conflict resolution and negotiation, interpersonal communication skills, cultural awareness, linguistics, civil disturbance, and support agency familiarization.

Most units conducted tough, realistic, civil disturbance training. Units that participated in Operation SAFE HAVEN and Operation SAFE PASSAGE trained aggressively on controlling civil disturbance. Units that conducted civil disturbance training deployed into displaced person camp operations with a higher degree of confidence than untrained units and individuals.

Commanders implemented cultural awareness training for soldiers. Intense home-station, METL-related training, followed by civil disturbance training, prepared soldiers for hostilities. Some units developed cultural awareness training to focus on the human dimension of OOTW to balance this mindset. Civil affairs and PSYOP personnel doctrinally trained in this area assisted commanders and soldiers in understanding the many different types of people and attitudes they would encounter in the civilian populations of the various displaced person camps.



Translator Support

Commanders and small unit leaders realized that qualified linguists were essential to the exchange of dialogue between the military and displaced persons. Some units used linguist support internal to their organization during camp operations. Leaders relied on the linguist to properly relay important information to the population. However, the quality of translations in linguistic support varied greatly. During Operation SAFE PASSAGE, commanders, concerned about soldier linguist proficiency, elected to test and then validate bilingual soldiers during training scenarios. Validating soldiers prior to interacting with the displaced persons increased leader/translator confidence.

Deploying units acquired riot control equipment in preparation for possible civil disturbance. Units requisitioned riot control equipment through U.S. Army supply channels or local purchase. Most equipment arrived within 14 days after requisitioning. However, large-quantity items, such as pepper spray and shin guards, arrived piecemeal or, in some cases, did not arrive until units deployed into theater. Having the equipment on hand during training adds realism and provides the unit a better ability to accurately train to task. Some equipment, specifically face shields and body shields, broke during civil disturbance and trainup for displaced person operations.

ROE and Force Protection

Training units for war produced units fully capable for conducting operations other than war. Operations SEA SIGNAL, SAFE HAVEN, and SAFE PASSAGE demonstrated that units that conduct hard, realistic training for war produce the disciplined soldiers needed to perform OOTW missions. METL tasks and STXs were fairly constant, but conditions required modifications. Mission-specific training, such as MP skills, had to be mastered in predeployment training.

The ROE demanded discipline from every soldier operating in or near displaced persons. In every case, displaced persons that threatened each other or U.S. forces were met with the appropriate level of response. Keeping the ROE simple and flexible for commanders and small-unit leaders was instrumental in achieving success during camp operations. Be aware that the displaced person population knows the ROE and many attempt to use that knowledge to its advantage.



Accounting for Displaced Persons

Accounting for displaced persons was a critical issue for commanders operating camps. Accounting for individual members of large camp populations was one of the most frustrating and time-consuming tasks associated with camp operations. The difficulty was aggravated by the size of the camps. Each camp had approximately 2,000 displaced persons.

U.S. camp commanders implemented different techniques, procedures, and systems to determine the daily camp population. Using the Deployable Mass Population Identification and Tracking System (DMPITS) assisted some camp commanders in accounting for the large camp populace. Others implemented early morning roll calls, physically and manually counting each displaced person against his/her bunk space, while other military camp leaders conducted headcounts before each meal using DMPITS or a physical count. In all cases, commanders were continually challenged in the accounting process.

Displaced Person Status and the Immigration Process

Tracking the immigration process for displaced persons presented unique challenges for camp commanders. During Operation SEA SIGNAL, camp commanders were unable to track the immigration status of displaced persons within their respective camps. The dynamic nature of the populated camps made it difficult to track this information. Clearly, the most important concern of a displaced person living inside a camp was his/her immigration status. Leaders and soldiers were inundated by countless requests from the displaced persons regarding the immigration process. Soldiers and leaders were not knowledgeable in this area. A tracking system at company or battalion level does not exist. However, during Operation SAFE HAVEN, the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) provided liaison between the appropriate agencies, the JTF, and camp commanders. CMOC representatives effectively served as the military link to the immigration process.



Information Support Campaign

A humanitarian information support campaign assisted camp commanders in standardizing information management for both U.S. soldiers and displaced persons. During camp operations, military leaders had concerns over the quality of information displaced persons received inside the camps. Most displaced persons had access to local Spanish television, other media, and visitation from family members. On many occasions, they received either incorrect information or information that needed clarification. On more than one occasion, civil unrest occurred because of inaccurate or slanted media reports.

An information campaign was initiated to help camp commanders and staffs manage information. PSYOP support was used in developing policies and guidelines as part of a camp information support operation. The camp information campaign included the publication of weekly camp newspapers, official bulletins, flyers, and periodic meetings with key displaced persons to dispel rumors. During Operation SAFE PASSAGE, the information support campaign played a critical role in the successful transport of Cuban displaced persons from Panama to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Periodic meetings between military and displaced person camp leaders were an effective way of influencing and controlling camp operations. Meetings, held weekly or as needed, were an excellent venue for both military and displaced person leaders. They were conducted along the lines of a command and staff meeting, or as military commander to displaced person leader(s). Meetings allowed camp leaders to express concerns or issues on behalf of the displaced persons. The military leadership also used the time to discuss health, welfare, recreation, and vocational-technical programs, or to dispel false information. Developing and sustaining a dialogue with the camp leaders also helped dispel the oppressive, aggressive ideas many of the displaced persons entertained against U.S. forces. ☺



Automated Prisoner Tracking System - Haiti

by CPT Robert Burns, Combat Maneuver Analyst, CALL

On 31 March 1995, 1st Platoon, 66th Military Police Company, took over advisory and security operations at the National Prison in Port-au-Prince. The platoon leader developed an automated prisoner tracking system. The results were significant, with implications for the Department of State's Ministerial Advisory Team Judicial, United Nations Mission In Haiti (UNMIH), MPs supporting the National Prison in Port-au-Prince, the Haitian Ministry of Justice, and the inmate population of the National Prison.

The National Prison in Port-au-Prince is the largest prison in Haiti. The prison frequently holds arrested suspects for six months or more before seeing a judge, even those arrested for small, petty crimes, such as practicing voodoo or traffic violations. Because judges and the prison staff did not communicate, the prison did not know when to release prisoners, so prison officials simply kept them. There was no tracking system for prisoners. With poor conditions, administrative corruption and little hope for release, the prison population was understandably sullen and volatile.

2LT Jincy R. Pace, the platoon leader, used Microsoft Access software and a laptop computer to develop "*Jailbase*," a prisoner tracking database system. She designed information fields tailored to the prison's needs:

- prisoner's name, including nicknames
- prisoner's number
- charge
- judicial district charging the prisoner
- inmate's arrival date
- last date inmate appeared before a judge
- inmate's sentence
- inmate's release date

This database had immediate, short-range benefits. For example, the prison administration now conducted prisoner headcounts knowing how many prisoners should be on hand. As of 6 April 1995, the National Prison contained 585 prisoners, including 42 women, 87 male juveniles and 5 female juveniles in a facility designed to hold 350 - 400 inmates. For the first time, the prison staff knew if a suspect had seen a judge, which prisoners had been sentenced, what district the prisoner was from, and how many juveniles were in the prison. Perhaps most importantly, they knew when to release prisoners who had served their sentence.


As a direct result of this tracking system, the U.S. State Department's Ministerial Advisory Team Judicial, working with the Ministry of Justice, successfully tracked imprisoned defendants and prisoners. Armed with this tracking data, the team brought judges to the prison for the first time ever to follow up cases from their districts. Judges and the prison staff communicated for the first time. Judges held court in the prison yard. They sentenced suspects, updated prisoner records and released prisoners. Specific, direct coordination occurred between judges, prison staff, Ministry of Justice officials and prisoners. On 6 April 1995, a Justice of the Peace from a northern Port-au-Prince district saw 65 minor offenders, and released 28.



Using the database, the Ministerial Advisory Team Judicial reduced time between a suspect's first day of incarceration until first appearance before a judge to less than 60 days in most instances (down from six or more months).

An official from the Haitian Ministry of Justice recognized Jailbase's valuable contribution to their legal system. 2LT Pace provided the official with the accumulated raw data and software shell. On 6 April 1995, 2LT Pace began training the prison's administrative staff to use the computer, access software and Jailbase.

In this OOTW, MPs performed an advisory role to the National Prison and, through their initiative, instituted potential reform for Haiti's judicial system. Military Police and Judge Advocate General teams are likely to encounter similar, problematic prison and judicial systems in future OOTW. Advisory teams could use Jailbase, or an improved derivative, when assisting dysfunctional judicial systems. Jailbase may also have application in tracking prisoners of war. ☺





Input A New Prisoner

Last Name: PIERRE

Cell Number: F

First Name: NELTHA

Prisoner Number: F99

Prisoner Status (M/F/J): F

Date of Arrival: 4/10/95

Charge: MISDEMEANOR W/INJURIES

Court District: NORTH

Date Seen by Judge: 4/10/95

Sentence:

Release Date:

STOP



Print A Prisoner List

Print All Prisoners
By Last Name

Print All Juveniles
By Last Name

Print All Prisoners
By Number

Print All Juveniles
By Number

Print All Prisoners
By Cell Block

Print All Females
By Last Name

Print All Juvenile
Females By Number

Print All Females
By Number

Print All Juvenile
Females By Name

Reports

Print Prison
Daily Report

Print Prisoners
By Court District

Print Releases
For Day

Print Release
Date Report

Print New For
Day

Accountability

STOP